In recent years, the increasing popularity of outsourcing data to third-party cloud servers sparked a major concern towards data breaches. A standard measure to thwart this problem and to ensure data confidentiality is data encryption. Nevertheless, organizations that use traditional encryption techniques face the challenge of how to enable untrusted cloud servers perform search operations while the actually outsourced data remains confidential. Searchable encryption is a powerful tool that attempts to solve the challenge of querying data outsourced at untrusted servers while preserving data confidentiality. Whereas the literature mainly considers searching over an unstructured collection of files, this paper explores methods to execute SQL queries over encrypted databases. We provide a complete framework that supports private search queries over encrypted SQL databases, in particular for PostgreSQL and MySQL databases. We extend the solution for searchable encryption designed by Curtmola et al., to the case of SQL databases. We also provide features for evaluating range and boolean queries. We finally propose a framework for implementing our construction, validating its practicality.
INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing data storage and processing to thirdparty servers, such as cloud servers, has become a common procedure. However, when it comes to storing personal or business confidential data, the usage of cloud services is currently questioned as as potentially malicious cloud servers may try to learn information from the data they store and the queries they process or even leak them to some unauthorized parties. Encryption is a standard approach to ensure the confidentiality of data outsourced at honestbut-curious cloud servers. However, "traditional" encryption schemes deprive the users of functionalities over the data, such as searching. In this case, to search words in encrypted outsourced data, the users are required to retrieve the entire dataset from the cloud, decrypt it and operate the search locally. This naive approach poses serious performance concerns which cancel out the benefit of outsourcing. Therefore, cloud servers should be able to perform the search operation in outsourced databases, while the actual databases are encrypted.
The problem of searching over encrypted data has received much interest from both academia (Song et al., 2000; Hacigümüş et al., 2002; Agrawal et al., 2004; Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Popa et al., 2012; Cash et al., 2013; Kamara and Papamanthou, 2013) and industry (Bitglass 1 , Cipher-Cloud 2 or Skyhigh 3 ). Research on this topic mainly focuses on the scenario of a user who outsources an encrypted collection of documents (such as e-mails, medical records, etc.) and would like to further search keywords over this encrypted dataset. While this theoretical setting is valid, in practice, many organizations such as governments, hospitals or companies store data in relational databases which structure data into tables according to a set of attributes. The popular SQL language (Chamberlin and Boyce, 1974) enables users to store, query and update their data in a user-friendly manner. SQL databases ensure fast record search and retrieval provided that the SQL server is able to read data content. As mentioned before, encryption typically impedes the server from reading data which makes search over encrypted databases challenging. In particular, a cryptographic data protection mechanism for searching over encrypted data stored in a SQL database should allow the server to efficiently process search queries without having access to the plaintext data. Besides, querying an encrypted SQL database should be user-friendly: protected que-ries should adopt the SQL syntax and simulate the search functionality as if data was not encrypted. A direct application of solutions for searching an encrypted collection of files to SQL databases is not straightforward. Indeed, existing solutions (Curtmola et al., 2006; Chase and Kamara, 2010; Cash et al., 2013; Kamara and Papamanthou, 2013) build an index of the keywords. In the case of SQL, data is arranged into tables, and records are queried based on a condition over one or more attributes. Therefore, keywords should preserve this notion of attribute. Furthermore, SQL allows performing comparisons of data (range queries) which are not always addressed in existing work. To solve these challenges, in (Popa et al., 2012) , the authors proposed CryptDB, a framework that supports SQL queries over encrypted data. This solution relies on layers of different property-preserving encryptions, such as deterministic (DET) and orderpreserving encryption (OPE), applied to a column of an SQL table. To query the encrypted database, CryptDB converts the plaintext SQL query into its encrypted equivalent and decrypts the targeted layers. The major drawback of CryptDB lies in the fact that whenever one layer is removed, the encryption scheme becomes weak. In light of this, the major problem is to deliver a practical solution for searching over encrypted databases that does not suffer from the leakage occurring in CryptDB and that enables transparent processing of complex queries over encrypted SQL databases.
In this work, we tackle this problem and propose a practical construction for searching over encrypted SQL databases which limits information leakage. Our solution builds upon the searchable encryption technique designed in (Curtmola et al., 2006) which applies to unstructured documents. This mechanism builds an inverted search index of keywords in the database to enable keyword search queries over encrypted data. We make the following contributions:
• We define a solution that is SQL-compatible, so as to empower user and server to use SQL's operations of database creation, data insertion and search. We propose a framework for implementing our solution on the PostgreSQL backend; • Our solution achieves practicality thanks to the use of the cuckoo hashing technique which renders the search in the index efficient; • Our solution supports complex queries, namely boolean and range queries; • We evaluate the practicality of our solution by testing it over an encrypted e-health database. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines searchable encryption and SQL databases. We describe our solution in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed implementation framework and a performance evaluation. We review existing work in Section 5. We conclude the paper and give some direction for future work in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES

Symmetric Searchable Encryption
We consider the following scenario: a user U wants to store a set D = {d 1 , d 2 , ..., d n } of confidential data at a server S. D contains a list of searchable keywords W = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ..., ω N }. To preserve data confidentiality, U encrypts D to obtain C = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n }, which is outsourced to S. A symmetric searchable encryption mechanism allows searching the keywords directly in C , without compromising data confidentiality nor query privacy. In (Curtmola et al., 2006) , the authors formally define symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) schemes by the following algorithms: 
SQL Databases
Our work focuses on data structured in SQL databases such as MySQL 4 or PostgreSQL 5 . An SQL database D organizes the data in a set of two-dimensional tables (T 1 , T 2 , .., T n ). Each table row is a record, the columns are attributes, and each table entry a value.
We assume the existence of a view V , resulting from a query applied to the data in D, which represents a subset of the records, selected from different tables in D, in such a way that queries can directly be processed on V . We mainly consider the SELECT operation that can be expressed as follows:
SELECT attributes FROM table WHERE conditions. This query retrieves from an SQL table (or a view) the records, and more precisely, the attributes specified after SELECT, that match conditions. In this work, we are interested in conditions that can be written as a boolean expression Q : r → {0, 1}, which, evaluated on a record r of D, returns Q (r) = 1, if r satisfies the expression or Q (r) = 0 otherwise. Q consists of several predicates P i that express conditions over one or more attributes in D and are combined with boolean operators: OR and AND. Each of the P i involves operators such as =, >, <, ≥, ≤ and relates a database attribute to a search criterion. Table 1 ). An example of predicate P 1 can be Name='Mary' where Name is an attribute and Mary the value to be searched for. In this paper, we consider the following queries, listed in Table 2 Range queries: They involve one or two predicates combined with an AND operator, and apply to numeric data to find value within a range. Complex queries: They combine conjunctions, disjunctions and range queries.
OUR SSE CONSTRUCTION FOR SQL DATABASES
To clarify the need for an SSE scheme dedicated to SQL databases, we first present an e-health use case that involves medical data. From this use case, we identify the gaps between the theoretical aspect of an SSE scheme and the practical requirement for an encrypted database.
Use Case
Let us consider a hospital that collects data from their patients. This data may consist of their personal information (names, age, etc.), their biological data (height, weight, body temperature, etc.) or the care they received (surgery operation, etc.). This data is managed in an SQL database (such as in Table 1 ). The hospital's information technology (IT) department would like to pay the service of a cloud provider to store and enable access to the data. However, since the e-health data is confidential and because the hospital must comply with strong regulations with respect to the storage and processing of medical data (such as the recent European General Data Protection Regulation (GPDR, 2016)), the IT staff encrypts the data before its outsourcing. Nevertheless, the hospital does not want to lose the functionalities offered by the SQL language. Therefore, the obfuscation of the e-health database should preserve (i) the format and the arrangement of the data, and (ii) the SQL functionalities such as creating and storing the database, or searching and retrieving particular records based on one or more attributes. It is clear that this use case falls into the model of searchable encryption as defined in Section 2.1.
Background
We base our work on the scheme described in (Curtmola et al., 2006) . Unlike our use case, the authors do not consider SQL databases but focus on an unstructured collection of files D. To enable user U to efficiently search for a keyword ω in the encrypted dataset C , this scheme builds an inverted search index I , that links each keyword ω with D(ω), the set of identifiers of documents containing ω. I is also obfuscated so that it does not disclose any information about the data. Only the holder of the secret key can issue a search query. The search time is linear in the size of D(ω), which is believed to be optimal (Curtmola et al., 2006) . Besides, the authors proved that their scheme is secure under IND-CKA1 (security against chosen-keyword attack). In a nutshell, this security definition requires that an adversary should learn nothing from the outsourced data and the index beyond what can be inferred from the search results and the access pattern, even if the adversary chooses the keywords. In particular, the search tokens do not leak information about the keywords. In what follows, we outline this SSE scheme:
KeyGen(1 κ ) → K : Key K consists of three pseudorandomly generated keys K ψ , K π and K ϕ used for two pseudo-random permutations 6 (ψ and π) and one pseudo-random function 6 ϕ respectively.
BuildIndex(D, K ) → I : As shown in Algorithm 1, it constructs three data structures:
contains a record identifier in D(ω i ), the key k i, j used to encrypt node N i, j+1 and the address in array A of N i, j+1 . Each node is encrypted using any semantically secure symmetric encryption 7 algorithm denoted E. Node N i,1 is encrypted using key k i,0 .
Array A: It stores nodes {N i, j } in a pseudorandom order. U uses key K ψ as input of ψ to compute the position of each N i, j in A. Look-up table T : Each entry in T is associated to a keyword ω i ∈ W and stores information about N i,1 , namely its address in A and the key k i,0 . This information is encrypted using a XOR operation with a key K i = ϕ(K ϕ , ω i ). T stores the encrypted information in a pseudo-random order, using π seeded with key K π . In (Curtmola et al., 2006) , the authors suggest, without giving further details, to implement T via a FKS dictionary (Fredman et al., 1984) .
At the end of BuildIndex, index I = (A, T ) is stored at server S.
Trapdoor(ω, K ) → τ ω : τ ω consists of the position pos of the entry in table T associated with ω and the key K ω to decrypt T [pos] . We recall that, if ω exists in D (without loss of generality, we assume that this keyword is ω i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N), then 6 A pseudo-random function is a polynomial-time function such that any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary cannot distinguish it from a truly random function. 7 Informally, a semantically symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) is a non-deterministic encryption algorithm which yields different ciphertexts for the same plaintext message. (E, D) denotes the pair of encryption and decryption functions.
T [pos i ] stores the address in array A of N i,1 and the key k i,0 . Therefore, τ ω consists of two values: pos = π(K π , ω) and K ω = ϕ(K ϕ , ω). 
Finally, the algorithm outputs the list D(ω i ). If one of these steps fails, then algorithm Search aborts and indicates that the keyword was not found. Generate random key k i, j 10 N i, j = recordID j ||k i, j ||ψ K ψ (ctr + 1) and encrypted under key k 5 Output each decrypted record ID
Requirements for SQL-compatibility
Given the scenario described in Section 3.1, we identify five requirements for designing an SSE solution that would support SQL databases:
R1: Dictionary Creation. The first requirement concerns the choice of the keywords W. In (Curtmola et al., 2006) , the authors only mention to "scan D to build the set of distinct words". In SQL databases, the data is structured into tables, where each record contains several attributes that take specific values. Hence, one can imagine that the dictionary would contain all the possible values in D. We show in Section 3.5 that such a dictionary does not work in the scope of SQL databases. Therefore, we specify an algorithm CreateDictionary to create an appropriate W.
R2: Practical Look-up Table T . The authors in (Curtmola et al., 2006) mention the use of an FKS dictionary (Fredman et al., 1984) , without giving much details about its implementation. FKS dictionaries are known to be memory expensive and finding the good hash that prevents hash collisions (as a matter of fact, a perfect hash function) when inserting a new item is a demanding process. For these reasons, we opt for another data structure, simpler to implement, more practical and more flexible, namely a cuckoo hash table. We give an overview of this data structure in Section 3.4.
R3:
Structured-data Encryption. In the case of unstructured datasets, each document is encrypted independently. In the case of SQL databases, the organization of data into SQL tables requires that each value in the tables is encrypted independently, using a semantically secure encryption algorithm. This will preserve the functionality of selecting specific attributes from an SQL table using the instruction SELECT attributes. Therefore, we will define two additional algorithms EncryptTable and DecryptResults.
R4: Transparent SQL Queries. In (Curtmola et al., 2006) , communication details between user and server are omitted. With SQL databases, querying data is a well-defined process that involves specific SQL instructions such as CREATE, INSERT or SELECT. In this paper, we require that a user transparently queries the database, meaning that no change is needed in the user's application program. Even in the case of encrypted data, our SSE scheme should respect the SQL language expressiveness, available in the case of plain databases.
R5: Complex Queries. Last but not least, the SSE in (Curtmola et al., 2006) does not tackle the problem of complex queries that contain range, conjunctive or disjunctive queries. We extend this solution with this functionality.
Before delving into the details of our proposal for a symmetric searchable encryption scheme, we outline in the next section the definition of cuckoo hashing.
Cuckoo Hash
In a cuckoo hash table T (Pagh and Rodler, 2004) , an item v can be stored in one of two possible entries, each located in two different tables, associated with two independent hash functions and a key x. The look-up operation, later denoted CuckooLookup(T , x), only requires to examine these two locations. The insertion of a new element v with key x, operation denoted CuckooInsert(T , x, v), evaluates the first hash function over x to give the first possible slot in the first table. If this slot is already assigned, then the item currently occupying this location is "kicked out" and v can be inserted in the emptied slot. The removed item is then moved to its alternative location assigned with the second hash function. This move may encounter another collision, thus requiring another element to be kicked out from its current location. This procedure is repeated until the last kicked-out item finds a free slot or when an endless loop is detected (or when the number of kickouts reaches a predefined maximum). In the latter case, the authors in (Pagh and Rodler, 2004) suggest to rehash the data structure, that is, to use two new hash functions.
Our Construction for Simple Keyword Queries
Our solution is built upon the technique described in (Curtmola et al., 2006) , but implements several modifications in order to satisfy the previously mentioned Table T contains t attributes and R records. Without loss of generality, for databases with multiple tables, we assume that we can reason on a view V extracted from a subset of these tables.
Our first proposal provides a solution to satisfy requirement R1.
We define an algorithm CreateDictionary to construct a dictionary W from D. As required by algorithm BuildIndex, the search index, built upon W, stores information about the records that contain each of the keywords. Besides, a basic SQL query contains a clause WHERE of the form attribute=value , meaning that we are interested in the records where the attribute has the specified value. Therefore, the search index must indicate that information. Hence, the dictionary W contains keywords under the form attribute=value. We denote n the size of W (n ≤ t × R). Let us take the example of the table PATIENT presented in Table 1 and consider the query SELECT * FROM PATIENT WHERE Name='David'. If W only listed the distinct words in the table, as it is the case in (Curtmola et al., 2006) , then the index would have lost the information that David is a possible value for the attribute Name. Note that David is also a value for the attribute Surname. In this case, the search over the index would have returned all the records that contain the word David, regardless of the attributes. To cope with this issue, we suggest to store the keywords ω of the form Name='David' in order to preserve the information on the attribute and to prevent the search from returning wrong results. Algorithm 3 depicts the operations to build dictionary W. To build index I = (A, T ), we first permute the rows in the database and then we follow the procedure described in Algorithm 4. In our case, we consider the record identifier, denoted as RecordID, as an additional attribute of the considered SQL table. To improve the efficiency of (Curtmola et al., 2006) 
The next operation in our SSE construction encrypts the SQL table with a semantically secure encryption scheme E = (E, D). As opposed to (Curtmola et al., 2006) , we define two encryption and decryption algorithms 8 (Algorithm 5). Algorithm EncryptTable encrypts each entry in the table separately, and because of the semantically secure property of the encryption scheme, each encrypted entry is indistinguishable from the others. Note that the attributes and the table names are also encrypted, but the extra attribute RecordID is left unencrypted, which does not impact the security of our scheme. Algorithm DecryptResults decrypts the encrypted records returned by the server after the execution of Search.
These two algorithms take as input secret key K , output by a modified algorithm KeyGen, that generates an additional key K enc .
Algorithm 5: C ← EncryptTable(D, K ). Table T To retrieve the records from the encrypted database based on a search criterion denoted ω, the user translates a plain SQL query such as SELECT * FROM PATIENT WHERE Name='David' (here ω corresponds to Name='David') into an encrypted SQL query, denoted SE query. This SE query requests the server to execute algorithm Search over the search index I using the search token generated with algorithm Trapdoor. Therefore, the search procedure operates in a challenge-response interaction between user U and server S with the following steps: 1. U executes algorithm Trapdoor to generate the search token τ ω for keyword ω. Then, U forms the following SE query: SELECT * FROM encrypted table WHERE RecordsID IN Search(I , τ ω ) (1) The most important and challenging part of this SE query is RecordsID IN Search(I , τ ω ) . The WHERE condition requests the execution of algorithm Search by the SQL server. Since this algorithm outputs D(ω), the WHERE condition collects the records whose RecordID is in the output of algorithm Search. 2. On execution of the SE query (1), S runs algorithm Search with the specified trapdoor τ ω on the indicated index. Algorithm Search is identical to the one defined in (Curtmola et al., 2006) , except the fact that we resort to algorithm CuckooLookup to look-up table T , as depicted in Algorithm 6.
Inputs :
The SE query (1) outputs the encrypted records that match the search criterion ω. The last step of our protocol decrypts the obtained records by calling algorithm DecryptResults. and encrypted under key k 5 Output each decrypted record ID Proposed Framework. In addition to the algorithms we specified in the abovementioned paragraphs, we suggest that our SSE construction follows the framework depicted in Figure 2 . Specifically, this framework allows to run the secure search function, namely algorithm Search, on a widely adopted SQL server, namely PostgreSQL.
The architecture of the proposed framework consists of two zones: Trusted Zone: It includes user U with an unmodified SQL client application. We define a proxy between U and S, which executes all the userside functions of our protocol. The keys generated with KeyGen are stored in a keystore. Untrusted Zone: It consists of the untrusted cloud server S running PostgreSQL that stores the encrypted database and the secure search index.
This PostgreSQL server is in charge of executing the function Search defined in Algorithm 6. As shown in Figure 1, our 
Boolean Queries
We propose to transform boolean queries into several subqueries. The server operates the intersection (in case of conjunction of keywords) or the union (in case of disjunction of keywords) of the search results and returns them to the user. Formally, our solution trans- 
Range Queries
Let us consider the attribute Age from the database example depicted in Table 3 shows table PATIENT extended with the attribute Range Age. Note that the user selects its preferences on the range interval and the initial value, based on the content of the database and the possible queries she may issue, depending on the use cases 10 . When user U wants to retrieve the records that match a range query, the proxy issues an SE query that contains the trapdoor(s) associated with the specified range. Different cases can be encountered: 1. The range query exactly corresponds to one of the range included in the search index. If we consider the example of 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Implementation. Our SSE scheme is implemented according to the architecture shown in Figure 2 . All the functions at the proxy are implemented in Java. The server runs PostgreSQL server (version 9.5). Search is coded in Java with PL/Java 11 , an addon for server-side procedures. The code is packed into a JAR that is further loaded into the PostgreSQL backend, so as to execute Search directly in PostgreSQL. We tested our prototype on a single machine that simulates both the proxy and the server. The machine has four 3.20GHz Intel Core TM i5-3470 processors, 32GB of RAM and runs Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. E-Health Database. This work is done in the context of a collaborative project named CLARUS 12 , which collected data from anonymized medical records of a hospital. This database consists of eight tables and queries are performed over a view (in the SQL terminology) called LAB. This view lists 64.440 records and comprises eight attributes, including a patient identifier (pat id), a patient name (pat name), a patient last name (composed of two parts pat last1 and pat last2) and an identifier of an episode of care (ep id). Results. We measured the time consumed by the phases described above over the e-health database. We let our program automatically add range attributes for pat id. The length of the ranges is 10: we insert Range pat id values of the form [0, 9], [10, 19], etc. We ran 100 executions of the functions, and computed the average time, listed in Tables 4 and 6. We com-pare these measurements with the case where upload (resp. search) is performed without the application of our SSE mechanism in Table 5 (resp. Table 7 ). The time needed by the server for storage is greater than the case where no encryption is performed, since the server is required to store the index together with the encrypted data. We evaluated single keyword queries (keywords with different numbers of occurrences) and range queries. The Retrieval phase is fast: less than 1 second to decrypt the search results. We recall that Search first finds the entry in table T associated with the searched keyword and then decrypts the corresponding linked list. In average, Search has acceptable costs, given that the data is encrypted. For the most frequent keyword, Search decrypts 4275 nodes which yields the time reported in Table 6 . In the case of range queries, we tested the query pat id ≥ 50 AND pat id < 150, which generates 10 trapdoors of the form Range pat id = [50, 59] , ..., Range pat id = [140, 149] (since we configured the attribute Range pat id with intervals of size 10). Thus, Search is executed 10 times. The Upload phase is relatively long (22 s) since BuildIndex scans the database value by value to create the index and involve a high amount of permutations. Nevertheless, these operations are performed only once for an unbounded number of queries. 
Query
Trapdoor |D(ω)| Search Decryption Single Keyword pat last2='GARCIA' 2 ms 4275 122 s 0, 37 s pat name='RAUL' 1 ms 178 5.6 s 0, 02 s pat name='MORAD' 1 ms 11 0.8 s 0, 002 s pat last1='DUC' 9 ms 0 0.5 s − Range Query 2, 0 ms 198 9.87 s 0, 04 s 
